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Searches by Environmental Protection
Agencies: When is a Warrant Necessary?
DAVID SPARKS*
During the course of fulfilling its duty to enforce the various
environmental protection laws, the Environmental Protection Agency
and its state equivalents are often called upon to perform searches of
business facilities. The need for these searches, within the context of
fulfilling enforcement responsibilities, raises the issue of whether the
owners of these facilities suffer violations of their constitutional
rights. Although one often thinks of constitutional violations in
connection with the investigation of violent criminal offenses, the
problem still exists under the rubric of the administrative agency
search.
This note will first examine the situations in which an environ-
mental protection agency has been required to obtain a search war-
rant and will then examine situations in which an agency has been
permitted to conduct a warrantless search of business premises. The
focus will be upon information which a practitioner would find
useful in advising business entities.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, support-
ed by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."' Thus, "[a] search
warrant must describe the objects of a search with reasonable speci-
ficity; general warrants are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment."2
However, "a reasonably specific warrant does not mean that the
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW; J.D., Class of 1995, University of Kentucky; B.S., 1992, Western Kentucky Uni-
versity.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 In re 949 Erie Street, 645 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (citing United
States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1121 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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warrant must be 'elaborately detailed' ... or enable authorities 'to
minutely identify every item for which they are searching."' 3 It is
instead sufficient that a search warrant "particularly describe the
things to be seized and prevent the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another."4
The significance of ascertaining whether a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred is, of course, that evidence unconstitutionally
seized is inadmissible against a defendant in a criminal trial.5 Nor-
mally, both the direct and indirect products of an unlawful search
may be excluded as evidence."
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS
It is true that the government generally cannot enter private
commercial property unless authorized by a valid search warrant.7
A businessman "has a constitutional right to go about his business
free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property."'
An administrative agency, however, may obtain a search war-
rant under somewhat different standards than a police officer or
prosecutor.9 An administrative warrant may issue where there is
specific evidence of an existing violation or where the search is part
of a general neutral administrative plan." It is well-settled that an
administrative warrant does not require the same degree of probable
cause as a criminal search warrant."
Id. (quoting Pritchard, 745 F.2d at 1122).
Id. (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927)).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914), overruled on other
grounds by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1978); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961).
6 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
0 National Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978)).
" Id. (citing West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (lth Cir.
1982); In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335,
1339 (7th Cir. 1979); Weyerhauser v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1979)).
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A. Evidence Sufficient to Obtain the Search Warrant
The "guiding rule in the analysis of probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment is that affidavits for a search warrant must be
treated in a common-sense and realistic manner, and warrants are
not to be given a hypertechnical interpretation."' 2 The Fourth
Amendment requires that the facts described in the underlying affi-
davit be sufficient to allow a neutral magistrate to reasonably con-
clude that probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. a
A review of cases in which an administrative search warrant
has been sought may be instructive in analyzing the amount and
type of evidence which issuing magistrates have found persuasive.
In Weyerhauser Co. v. Marshall,4 the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") unsuccessfully sought a search
warrant based upon an affidavit which only presented a generalized
summary of the one complaint which the agency had received. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that that affidavit was insuffi-
cient for an administrative search warrant to issue.s The same
court approved a warrant in In Re Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing
Co., 6 where OSHA presented an extremely detailed affidavit
which listed explicit site conditions and employee complaints regis-
tered against the facility. 7 One may find guidance on this issue by
heeding the court's comment that "the need for the inspection must
be weighed in terms of [the] reasonable goals of code enforce-
ment. 
8
An affidavit containing a detailed explanation of the hazardous
wastes known to be stored at a particular locale and the affiant's
personal observations 9 from earlier visits to the facility was found
" United States v. Myers, 553 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Kan. 1982) (citing In re
Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1377 (10th Cir. 1978); and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 106 (1965)).
'3 Id. (citing United States v. Hittle, 575 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Ci. 1978)).
'4 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
' Marshall, 592 F.2d at 378.
.6 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1339-42.
Id. at 1338 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967)).
'9 The district court opinion contains a more detailed explanation of her observa-
tions than is found in the Seventh Circuit's opinion. The affiant described discolored
soil, surface water body sediments, discontinuities in vegetation, and odors, all of which
suggested that hazardous wastes had been released. National-Standard Co. v. Adamkus,
685 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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to be sufficient for obtaining a search warrant in National Standard
Co. v. Adamkus.' The court was also influenced by the fact that
the affidavit was accompanied by photographs of the site depicting
dead vegetation and leaking barrels."
The Eighth Circuit approved an administrative search warrant
granted on the basis of a lengthy, detailed affidavit enumerating a
wide variety of suspected illegal activity in In re 4801 Fyler Ave-
nue.' This court reasoned that the firm's Fourth Amendment rights
were adequately protected by the affidavit's specific description of
numerous incidents of the company mixing contaminated waste oil
with pure oil for resale, as well as evidence that sludge from clean-
up activities had been buried on the site.' Company records per-
taining to used oil and hazardous waste operations were properly
seized based upon the affidavit issued.' Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit held in West-Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan' that
sufficent probable cause supported the issuance of an administrative
search warrant where the agency seeking the warrant presented an
affidavit based upon 70 interviews.26
A company's argument that a search warrant was an impermis-
sible general warrant was rejected in In re 949 Erie Street." The
business in question provided environmental testing and consulting
services with regard to compliance with EPA standards. The court
found that the warrant was thoroughly supported by detailed allega-
tions of information obtained in interviews with the firm's former
employees and from a perusal of regulatory agencies' files.' Taken
together, the information established numerous discrepancies be-
tween actual test results and what was reported to the agencies.29
Perhaps the best summary of when an affidavit will be suffi-
cient to obtain an administrative search warrant is that expressed by
an Illinois district court in National Standard Co. v. Adamkus.'
This court noted that an affidavit is adequate to support a probable
cause determination when "it provide[s] the magistrate with the
Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1989).
21 Id.
- 879 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1989).
2 Id.
24 Id. at 390.
2 689 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1982).
26 Id. at 958.
" 645 F. Supp. 55, 59 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
n Id.
Id.
" 685 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Il. 1988).
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underlying factual data giving rise to the compliance officer's belief
that a violation existed. In the end, of course, the ultimate test is
reasonableness: is the inspection reasonable and is it justified?"'"
B. Scope of the Search Warrant
When is the scope of an administrative search warrant
overbroad? The party named in a warrant in National Standard Co.
v. Adamkus32 protested when the EPA collected background sam-
ples at its facility in order to determine the nature of any corrective
action which might be necessary. 3 National Standard Company
contended that § 6924(u) of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA)' did not authorize the EPA to conduct a "fishing
expedition" at its facility.35 The court rejected this argument and
found that the warrant was not overbroad, stating that "[b]ackground
sampling is a mode of 'inquiry and investigation traditionally
employed' in the type of scientific sampling authorized [in RCRA]"
and that there was "no indication in the statute that Congress intend-
ed to foreclose EPA from taking control of background samples in
the ordinary course of scientific investigation. 36
On the other hand, "a search warrant so broad that it allows
seizure of all or almost all of the business papers of an entity is
constitutionally permissible only if the government can show proba-
ble cause to believe that fraud permeated the entire business opera-
tion."'
Similarly, in Pieper v. United States,38 it was held that when a
warrant, whether administrative or criminal, is issued for the inspec-
tion of business records on the basis of one suspected violation, the
search warrant must express, with some degree of particularity, the
dates of the records sought.39 Upon the facts of that particular
case,' the court held that while the warrant issued improperly
"' Id. at 1047 (quoting Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d
1313, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1980)) (internal citations omitted).
32 881 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1989).
33 Id. at 354.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988).
Adamkus, 881 F.2d at 354.
6 Id. at 362 (citing the unpublished district court memorandum opinion).
" In re 4801 Fyler Avenue, 879 F.2d 385, 391 (8th Cir. 1989) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1986)).
604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1134.
40 The defendant operated Bradley Exterminating Company. An EPA inspector
1994-95]
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lacked such a limitation, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law
for the violation and thus the court refused to invoke equitable
jurisdiction."
An attorney seeking to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant should carefully scrutinize the warrant itself in order
to determine if the agency can be accused of overreaching the rea-
sonable scope of the search warrant. If this is the case, then counsel
should argue that the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant
should be excluded.
C. Obtaining the Warrant in an Ex Parte Proceeding
A search warrant, whether criminal or administrative, is typical-
ly obtained in an ex parte proceeding. The fact that the object of the
desired warrant is not present does not in and of itself demonstrate
bad faith.42 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the issuance
of an administrative search warrant on an ex parte basis.43 Indeed,
such a proceeding is authorized even if a related civil action is
pending." An attorney may thus have little to gain by raising this
issue.
Whether one may challenge the factual basis supporting an
administrative search warrant is a matter "committed to the sound
discretion" of the issuing judicial officer. 5 Such an approach may
be warranted depending upon the specific facts of the case the prac-
titioner encounters.
investigating a reported violation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) asked to see the company's records for the previous two-month period.
Pieper offered to show the inspector the records pertaining to the allegation but refused
him access to other company records. The inspector obtained a search warrant which did
not limit the records to be searched. He subsequently seized 19 months of records. Id. at
1332.
Id. at 1134.
National Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1989)(citing
Midwest Growers Co-Op. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 464 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Stanley
Plating Co., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 71, 72 (D. Conn. 1986)).
4 Stoddard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1980).
Adamkus, 881 F.2d at 363; see also In re Stanley Plating, 637 F. Supp. 71, 72
(D. Conn. 1986).
' Adamkus, 881 F.2d at 363 n.14 (quoting In re Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589
F.2d 1335, 1340 (7th Cir. 1979)). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)
("A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by the
courts."), and Donovan v. Mosher Steel Co., 791 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986)
("The reviewing court is charged with examining the magistrate's actual probable cause
determination - not what he or she might have concluded based on information not
presented in the warrant application.").
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III. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
It is also possible for an administrative agency to conduct a
warrantless search of business premises under certain conditions.
The rationale permitting such searches is that "the expectation of
privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such prop-
erty differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's
home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances,
be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrant-
less inspections."' In other words, the commercial property
owner's interest "is not one in being free from any inspections. '
This is due to the broad authority Congress possesses "to regulate
commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate com-
merce," and because "an inspection program may in some cases be
a necessary component of federal regulation."' The Donovan court
interpreted the decisions on this issue as providing "that a warrant
may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably
determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regu-
latory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property
cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to period-
ic inspections undertaken for specific purposes."'49
The ability of administrative agencies to conduct warrantless
searches may be a significant factor in their success and efficiency
in enforcing environmental protection laws. Thus, it will be useful
to look at decisions permitting such warrantless searches by other
agencies in an effort to distill the essential ingredients.
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,'° a warrantless
search was permitted because the alcoholic beverage industry had a
lengthy history of governmental regulation. This search warrant
exception is sometimes referred to as the "longstanding governmen-
tal regulation" exception.5' In similar fashion, the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Biswell,5 2 approved the warrantless search of a
gun dealer's business because of the strong federal interest in gun
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
41 Id. at 599.
4 Id.
49 Id. at 600.
397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
New Jersey v. Santiago, 527 A.2d 963, 965 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1986).
5 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
1994-951
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control, and the existence of a comprehensive inspection scheme.
This exception is occasionally known as the "pervasive governmen-
tal regulation" exception. 3
On the other hand, the Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 4 Court re-
fused to uphold a warrantless search by OSHA. The Court found
that there was no reasonable expectation that the subject property
would actually be subjected to warrantless searches because the
applicable OSHA regulations applied to all businesses engaged in
interstate commerce."
Warrantless administrative searches have now been upheld in a
variety of regulated industries. Such searches have been upheld in
the mining industry,56 the food and drug industry," the commer-
cial fishing industry,58 the shipping industry, 9 and the boating in-
dustry.'
The common thread in each of these cases appears to be a
balancing of "the need for warrantless regulatory searches against
the business owner's reasonable expectation of privacy."' Four
factors have been significant in this analysis:
(1) whether the business operator is on notice that he is engaged
in activity which may subject him to warrantless searches;
(2) whether the regulation of the industry is pervasive and regular,
considering the history of the regulatory scheme;
(3) whether there is a strong governmental interest in the search;
and
(4) whether there are reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards governing the search.62
As for the second factor, the history of the regulatory scheme
may not be determinative, for otherwise even a carefully constructed
warrantless search scheme would fail in the case of a new or emerg-
ing industry "because of the recent vintage of regulation." 3
Santiago, 527 A.2d at 965.
', 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
I Id. at 314-15.
'6 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
" United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137, 1142 (5th Cir. 1978).
United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980).
'9 United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 1980).
' United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979).
6' Pennsylvania v. Lutz, 516 A.2d 339, 343 (Pa. 1986), vacated, 538 A.2d 872
(Pa. 1988).
6 id.
' Id. at 345.
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A. A Case Holding A Warrantless Administrative Search Improper
Despite the apparently expansive nature of the jurisprudence
permitting warrantless administrative searches, particular fact pat-
terns may lead to different results. A recent Ohio Court of Appeals
decision, Ohio v. Denune,6 stands as a reminder of this proposi-
tion.
Harry Denune was the sole shareholder of Dixie Distributing,
Inc. ("Dixie"), a corporation engaged in hazardous waste disposal.'
An anonymous telephone caller to the Ohio Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (OEPA) warned that a tractor trailer containing
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) would be moved from Dixie's
warehouse in Springfield, Ohio, immediately prior to a scheduled
OEPA inspection of the warehouse.' OEPA inspectors arrived at
the warehouse, witnessed the tractor trailer leave, and followed it to
a salvage yard where it was parked next to six other trailers belong-
ing to Dixie.67
The inspectors could see fifty-five gallon drums through holes
in the six trailers already in the salvage yard, but could not see into
the newly arrived trailer." They contacted the caretaker of the sal-
vage yard and told him that they would like to inspect the newly
arrived trailer; the caretaker's supervisor did not object to this re-
quest.' The inspectors subsequently discovered ten transformers
containing PCBs, with slight oil leakages from the seals on the
drum.7° Based upon the evidence obtained in this search, the in-
spectors obtained a search warrant for the other six trailers and
discovered many leaking containers of hazardous substances.7
Denune and Dixie were convicted in a jury trial of illegal trans-
portation, disposal, and storage of hazardous waste; failure to evalu-
ate waste; failure to conduct analyses of waste; failure to prepare a
uniform waste manifest; criminal endangering; and illegal operation
of a hazardous waste facility.' The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
612 N.E.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1993).
61 Id. at 770.
66 Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 770.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 776.
70 Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 770-71.
' Id. at 771.
I d. at 770.
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versed the convictions, holding that the evidence obtained in the
searches should have been suppressed as unconstitutionally
seized."
Although the state argued this case in part as a permissible
warrantless administrative search, the court rejected this theory
completely, holding that nothing in the statutory language could
fairly be read as abolishing the warrant requirement. 4 Indeed, the
court cited one statutory provision specifically recognizing the exis-
tence of the warrant requirement.
75
The state also relied upon other exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement to justify the search. First, the
state asserted that the search was authorized under the "automobile"
exception.76 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that "the
mere fact of a trailer being moved from a large warehouse early in
the morning is [not] so unusual or indicative of criminal conduct as
to give probable cause to search" or, alternatively, even if the anon-
ymous caller's tip was proven true, that information was not suffi-
ciently specific so as to provide probable cause to search the trail-
er."n
The court also rejected a similar argument that the manner in
which the trailer was transported gave rise to a suspicion of criminal
activity. The court stated that although the trailer was heavily laden
and parked in an environmentally sensitive area this was not an
indication that it contained hazardous waste.78
In addition, the Denune court rejected the argument that the
appearance of the drums in the other six trailers pointed to criminal
activity.79 The court reasoned that the inspectors had no definite
reason to suspect the trailers contained hazardous wastes or, alterna-
tively, that even if the six trailers were suspicious, the inspectors did
not have a reasonable basis upon which to search the newly arrived
trailer.'
" Id. at 777.
'4 Id. at 773, 776.
71 Id. at 773.
76 This exception was first articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153 (1925). Basically, this exception authorizes a warrantless search where there is prob-
able cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband and the search is conducted under
exigent circumstances. State v. Welch, 480 N.E.2d 384, 387 (Ohio 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1010 (1985).
Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 774.
Id.
7I Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 775.
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The court also rejected the argument that the search was justifi-
able under the "mobility" exception8 because at the time the
search was conducted the trailer had already been disconnected from
the tractor. 2 Thus, there was little danger that it would be trans-
ported from the salvage yard. 3 In addition, the court rejected the
state's contention that the search was permissible because of the
potential danger that the suspected hazardous substances posed to
the environment." Despite arguments stressing that the trailer was
situated on a flood plain in close proximity to a wildlife refuge, the
court found that there was no showing that environmental harm was
imminent or that immediate action was necessary.'
An additional argument advanced by the state was that the
search was valid pursuant to the consent exception to the search
warrant requirement.8 6 The court again rejected this argument, not-
ing that access to the trailer was obtained by breaking a padlock be-
cause no one present at the salvage yard had a key to unlock it."
Thus, it was unreasonable for the inspectors to believe the salvage
yard personnel had control over the trailer.88
It is certainly arguable that the court's reasoning on the fact
pattern presented in the case was not persuasive and that the war-
rantless search should have been found permissible under one or
more of the several exceptions argued. Indeed, Judge Young "vehe-
mently disagree[d]" with the majority's opinion and would have
found the search justified under the "automobile exception."'" Nev-
ertheless, the lesson to be learned from Denune is that some courts
strictly adhere to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and
permit warrantless searches only in circumscribed situations. Per-
" The "mobility" exception is an exigent circumstance relating to the rapid ability
of a motorized vehicle to leave the jurisdiction in which a warrant would have to be
sought. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985).




' The aspect of the consent exception upon which the state relied was that articu-
lated in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). Rodriguez held that a warrantless
entry is valid when based on the consent of a third party whom the police, or here the
OEPA officials, reasonably believe to possess authority over the property, but who in
fact does not possess this authority. L at 188. The state argued that the inspectors
reasonably believed that the salvage yard personnel possessed authority over the trailers.
Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 775.
" Denune, 612 N.E.2d at 776.
" Id.
Id. at 777 (Young, J., dissenting).
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haps these courts come closer to providing corporate citizens with
the level of constitutional protection to which they should be enti-
tled. In any event, the practitioner whose client is confronted with a
similar scenario may be well advised to consult Denune in preparing
a motion to suppress.
B. Statutory Authorization for Warrantless Administrative Searches
Many statutes now provide explicitly for warrantless admin-
istrative searches, and courts have been generally unwilling to find
these statutes constitutionally defective. The court in Pennsylvania v.
Blosenski Disposal Service' was faced with a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless administrative search authorized by §
608 of Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act." Upholding
the statute, the court noted that unlike the OSHA administrative
search invalidated in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,' the search at
issue involved a single, heavily regulated industry.93 The court be-
lieved that given the "vital public and statutory interest" in environ-
mentally sound solid waste disposal, unannounced inspections could
be anticipated." Thus, this statutory warrantless search was held
valid under the "Colonnade95-Biswell"9 exception to the Fourth
Amendment's search warrant requirement, as Donovan v. Dewey'
had explained the doctrine.9 The most recent pronouncement
from the United States Supreme Court on the subject of warrantless
inspections of a pervasively regulated business pursuant to a statute
is New York v. Burger." It appears that the analysis adopted by the
Court is very similar to the four-factor analysis discussed above,"
which courts have previously employed in determining whether
warrantless searches were constitutionally proper. In order for a
warrantless inspection of a heavily regulated business to be reason-
9 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989).
" 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6018.608(3) (Supp. 1985).
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
'3 Blosenski Disposal Service was in the business of solid waste disposal. The
action in this case was initiated because this firm was observed operating a transfer
station without a permit. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d at 845-46.
Id. at 850.
" Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
452 U.S. 594, 598-606 (1981).
566 A.2d at 848.
' 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
'® See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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able:
(1) There must be a substantial government interest that
forms the basis of the regulatory scheme pursuant to which
the inspection is made.
(2) The warrantless inspections must be necessary to further
the regulatory scheme; and
(3) The statute's inspection program must provide a consti-
tutionally adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the
certainty and regularity of its application.'1
The third criterion determines whether the owner of the com-
mercial premises has been sufficiently advised that the search is
being made pursuant to the law, has a properly defined scope, and
limits the discretion of the inspection officers."° Taken together,
these criteria serve as a substitute for the Fourth Amendment's
search warrant requirement.'0 3
A decision applying the Burger standard to a warrantless envi-
ronmental agency search authorized by statute is New Jersey v.
Bonaccurso.lt An inspector from the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection responded to a complaint alleging that a
red substance was polluting a stream. 5 Following the stream
through public lands until it ended in a swamp only 200 feet from
the defendant's slaughterhouse, the inspector went onto the premises
and asserted his statutory authority to investigate the facility."
The company was found to be improperly discharging bloody waste
materials into this water supply."° The firm apparently corrected
this problem for a time."
Two years later a different inspector responded to a similar
complaint and conducted another warrantless search of the land
surrounding the slaughterhouse."° When the defendant moved to
suppress the evidence discovered, the state argued that the search
was justified by either the long-standing governmental regulation
exception to the warrant requirement or by the open fields doc-
'0' Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 (citations omitted).
'02 New Jersey v. Bonaccurso, 545 A.2d 853, 856 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
103 Id.
" 545 A.2d 853 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
0'5 Id. at 854.
o6 Id. at 854-55.
'07 Id. at 855.
lo Id.
" Bonaccurso, 545 A.2d at 855.
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trine." °
Using the Burger analysis, the court approved the warrantless
search. It found that New Jersey had enunciated a substantial gov-
ernment interest and had responded by enacting a legislative scheme
which attempted to alleviate the problem in a reasonable time, place,
and manner."' Indeed, the defendant did not seriously dispute the
extensive regulation of the meat packing industry or the statute's
constitutionality, but focused instead on the argument that the proper
regulatory body was the New Jersey Department of Agriculture and
that, therefore, the Department of Environmental Protection could
not properly conduct a warrantless search." 2 The court quickly
disposed of this argument, holding that these departments had con-
current jurisdiction over the slaughterhouse and its operation." 3
A court is unlikely to hold invalid a statute permitting a war-
rantless administrative search. The practitioner's best strategy may
be to argue that the statute does not apply to a particular fact pattern
or that it does not in fact dispense with the warrant requirement."4
C. Open Fields Doctrine
Another exception to the requirement for a search warrant is
known as the "open fields" doctrine. There is no warrant require-
ment in these situations because there is no "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."5 No justifiable expectation
of privacy is present when the incriminating evidence or activities
are readily observable by persons on adjacent lands."6 The impor-
tance of this doctrine to an administrative agency's right to conduct
inspections may be enormous, for environmental contamination is
the type of violation which commonly occurs in areas readily acces-
sible to the public.
The open fields doctrine was first explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Hester v. United States."7 Despite the
fact that the police were trespassing, the Court held that no illegal
IlO d.
"I Id. at 857.
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 857-58.
" See, e.g., Deune, supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
'is See, e.g., Miller v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 642 N.E.2d 475, 483 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).
116 Id. (citing 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.3(c), at 391 (2nd ed. 1987)).
.. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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search had occurred because the police testified as to what they had
observed from outside the home."' The Fourth Amendment pro-
tection afforded people in their "persons, homes, papers, and ef-
fects" does not extend to the "open fields.""..9
A more recent explanation of the doctrine appears in Oliver v.
United States:'20
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activi-
ties that the Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental
interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in pro-
tecting the privacy of those activities... that occur in open
fields.... [Tjhe asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is
not an expectation that "society recognizes as reasonable."''
In establishing the parameters of this doctrine, a bright line rule
has been adopted which looks exclusively at the character of the
land and does not permit "consideration of whether the landowners
had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient number of
warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded
to establish a right of privacy.' 22
The open fields doctrine was specifically applied in the context
of outdoor commercial property in Air Pollution Variance Bd. of
Colorado v. West Alfalfa Corp.123 The defendant in that case chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a state health inspector's entry onto
its land, in daylight, without consent and without a warrant, in order
to conduct opacity tests 24 of smoke being emitted from chimneys.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Court of
Appeals decision, holding that the inspection was well within the
open fields exception to the Fourth Amendment."2 The Court not-
ed that the inspector did not enter the corporation's facility or offic-
es but only based his findings on what anyone in the city near the
plant could see."2
.. id. at 58-59.
"9 Id. at 59.
'2 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
.2 Id. at 179.
2 New Jersey v. Bonaccurso, 545 A.2d 853, 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988)(citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181).
3 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
324 An opacity test measures the extent to which a substance is opaque; that is, the
extent to which it is impenetrable to light WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIO-
NARY, 826 (1988).
"' West Alfalfa, 416 U.S. at 865.
126 id.
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The open fields doctrine was applied in another administrative
agency setting in Ohio v. Paxton.2 An inspector from the Toledo
Health Department had conducted four separate warrantless searches
of Paxton Recycling's facility in response to a complaint alleging
that the company was burying garbage, trash, and demolition mate-
rials on the property.' The inspector walked around the premises
and took videotapes and photographs. 29 The court held that the
open fields doctrine was applicable in this case because the area
inspected was easily accessible to the public and because the nature
of the activity conducted on the premises (disposal of debris and
other garbage) was not one in which the firm could reasonably
demand or expect privacy, nor was it an expectation that society had
an interest in protecting.' Indeed, the court held that it was irrele-
vant that the inspector may have been trespassing during the inspec-
tions."
Perhaps the most interesting, or disturbing, application of the
open fields doctrine to a business enterprise is found in Dow Chemi-
cal v. United States.' After an on-site EPA inspection of Dow
Chemical Company's manufacturing facility in Midland, Michigan,
the company denied the EPA's request for a second inspection.'
Rather than seek an administrative search warrant, however, the
EPA employed a commercial aerial photographer to take photo-
graphs of the facility from altitudes of 1,200, 3,000, and 12,000
feet.'
34
The United States Supreme Court held that the taking of aerial
photographs of the facility from navigable airspace was not an un-
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 3 - More specifi-
cally, the Court held that the open areas of an industrial complex
with numerous plant structures spread over a 2,000 acre area were
not analogous to the curtilage of a house; instead, this area is prop-
erly comparable to an open field subject to the observations of
persons in aircraft."
12 615 N.E.2d 1086 (Ohio CL App. 1992).
I d. at 1088.
129 Id.
'30 Id. at 1094.
131 id.
.3 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
'3 Id. at 229.
' id.
5 Id. at 239.
136 id.
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The Court reasoned that the photographs at issue were not so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.
37
The Court was also influenced by its perception that Dow had taken
no precautions against aerial intrusions, even though the plant was
near an airport.
138
Despite these precedents, some courts have been reluctant to
apply the open fields doctrine in the context of business property.
These courts reason that the basic premise of the open fields doc-
trine, that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an
open field, is sometimes incompatible with the idea that a business
owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his property.
39
This concern rings especially true in the context of businesses
which, by their very nature, must be conducted outdoors."4
The open fields doctrine remains a constant weapon for an
administrative agency to use in appropriate factual scenarios. The
practitioner seeking a shield from its blows may have a difficult
task. One might seek, however, to garner facts which demonstrate
that the objectionable evidence was gathered by highly invasive
means from a secluded, nonpublic area. Such an approach attacks
the theoretical underpinnings which justify dispensing with the
warrant requirement.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the practitioner must be prepared to advise cli-
ents with more than a casual contact with environmental regulation
that an environmental protection agency may be able to conduct
judicially authorized searches as well as warrantless searches on
their premises. Whether by explicit statutory authorization or by
common law principles such as the "pervasive governmental regula-
tion" or "open fields" doctrines, an agency inspector may well pay
'17 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238.
" Id. at 237 n.4 (citing United States v. Dow Chemical Co., 749 F.2d 307,312
(6th Cir. 1984)). The dissent, however, expressed a belief that Dow had in fact included
procedures in its security program designed to protect the facility from aerial photogra-
phy. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 241-42.
"' Pennsylvania v. Lutz, 516 A.2d 339, 346 (Pa. 1986), vacated, 538 A.2d 872
(Pa. 1988).
'" Lutz, 516 A.2d 346 (citing United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 701-02 (7th
Cir. 1982)) (holding that a used car dealer's parking lot was part of the "business curti-
lage" and thus not subject to warrantless search after business hours); Allinder v. Ohio,
614 F. Supp. 282, 288 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that the open fields doctrine cannot
apply to a warrantless administrative search of a beekeeping facility)).
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your client a surprise visit.
In an ideal world, even an unannounced visit would not be a
problem because the business would be in complete compliance
with all applicable environmental regulations. In reality, however,
even the most diligent and conscientious client may have trouble
keeping up with the complex and ever-changing body of environ-
mental regulation. By impressing upon the client the possibility of
the unexpected inspection visit, two worthwhile goals may be
achieved. First, the otherwise environmentally-sound client will not
risk stiff fines and perhaps stigmatization from the agency discover-
ing a minor violation which the client might otherwise be slow to
correct. Second, society as a whole should benefit from the in terro-
rem effect of possible unexpected regulatory visitors, as clients who
might otherwise be lax are scared into compliance efforts.
Under our system of government, with its focus upon the pres-
ervation of individual rights and restrictions upon intrusive govern-
mental activity, a warrantless search should be the exception, not the
rule. If the environmental protection laws are to be enforced and the
authority to inspect business premises is to remain an effective and
credible deterrent to violations, however, the various agencies must
be allowed to perform unannounced, even frequent, inspections."'
The practitioner must be cognizant of this reality, but at the same
time should emphasize the reasoning of cases like Denune when an
argument for exclusion should be advanced. In an era of increasing
environmental awareness and resultant governmental regulation, this
may become more than a hypothetical concern.
". New Jersey v. Santiago, 527 A.2d 963, 967 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1986)
(citing United States v. Biswell, 406 US. 311, 316 (1972)).
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